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Abstract. This note deals with the stability properties of an economy where the central
bank is concerned with stock market developments. We introduce a Taylor rule reacting to
stock price growth rates along with ination and output gap in a New-Keynesian setup. We
explore the performance of this rule from the vantage of equilibrium uniqueness. We show
that this reaction function is isomorphic to a rule with an interest rate smoothing term, whose
magnitude increases in the degree of aggressiveness towards asset prices growth. As shown by
Bullard and Mitra (2007, Determinacy, learnability, and monetary policy inertia, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 39, 11771212) this feature of monetary policy inertia can help at
alleviating problems of indeterminacy.
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1. Introduction
The increasingly frequent episodes of nancial turmoil in the last two decades have drawn con-
siderable attention on stock markets developments and on their interdependencies with the real
economy. Both policy makers and researchers have debated around the opportunity to design poli-
cies capable to a¤ect stock price dynamics in order to improve the macroeconomic performance of
both industrialized economies and emerging markets. At the same time, since the seminal work
by Taylor (1993) it has become common practice to think about monetary policy in terms of in-
terest rate rules whereby the monetary authority controls the nominal rate of interest in response
to ination and output deviations from their equilibrium level. These parallel developments have
stimulated a long-standing debate on the role and scope of central banks to implement interest
rate rules where the policy instrument responds to asset prices deviations from their equilibrium
level, along with reacting to changes in economic conditions. Bullard and Schaling (2002) show
that responding to equity prices misalignments from their equilibrium level does not improve the
economic performance, and might possibly harm real and nancial stability. Including equity prices
misalignments into a Taylor-type policy rule potentially introduces a root of indeterminacy of the
rational expectations equilibrium. Our study builds on this framework.
We show that an explicit response to stock price growth rates translates into a policy rule fea-
turing an interest rate smoothing term,1 whose magnitude increases in the degree of aggressiveness
towards asset prices growth. Thus the central bank will smooth out changes in the nominal interest
rate in response to changes in economic conditions. Conversely, the structural response coe¢ cients
to output gap and ination are weakened by an increase in the response to stock prices growth.
As shown by Woodford (2003) and Bullard and Mitra (2007), monetary policy inertia can help
at alleviating problems of indeterminacy and non-existence of stationary equilibrium observed for
some commonly-studied monetary policy rules. Our results suggest that the reaction parameters
in the inertial rule can be obtained through the re-parameterization of an original rule where the
central bank responds to equity rates of return. In turn, this could indeed reect an interest in stock
market developments from the policy makers perspective. Also Rudebusch (2006) suggests that
policy gradualism could reect some desire on the part of the central bank to reduce the volatility
in interest rates and, more generally, in asset prices.
A substantial body of theoretical and empirical research has explored the potential role of
monetary authorities in enhancing nancial stability and preventing non-fundamental movements
in the stock market. However, broad consensus has so far not emerged. Bernanke and Gertler (1999,
2001) design a framework where nancial frictions give rise to a nancial accelerator mechanism
that magnies the e¤ects of both exogenous and policy shocks. In their framework a shock to asset
prices increases aggregate demand, hence driving up the price level. They conclude that there is no
need for a direct response to asset prices, as a central bank that responds to general price ination is
1 Inertia is a well-documented feature of central bank behavior in industrialized countries. Rudebusch (1995, 2006)
provides insightful statistical analysis of this fact.
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implicitly responding to asset price movements. They argue in favor of a monetary policy that does
not respond to asset prices, except insofar as they signal changes in expected ination. Conversely,
Genberg et al. (2000) follow the modelling strategy of Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), and
argue that central banks should respond to asset prices to stabilize the economy and to prevent
from the rise of bubbles.2 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) emphasize the link between protability and
output gap in a sticky price environment. They show how a central bank trying to avoid bubbles
can inadvertently introduce non-fundamental movements into both asset prices and real activity
by reacting to asset prices misalignments. It is a well-established fact that in sticky price models
marginal costs are proportional to the output gap. An interest rate rule that responds positively
to (expected or current) values of stock prices is a rule that responds positively to dividends. This
creates a potential problem from the perspective of equilibrium determinacy.
Di Giorgio and Nisticò (2007) study monetary policy design in a two-country model where agents
can invest their wealth in stock and bond markets. They show that central banks reacting to stock
price growth help at eliminating risks of endogenous instability. In this case, the simple commitment
to the Taylor Principle is su¢ cient to restore equilibrium determinacy. Nisticò (2006) discusses a
structural model with stock-wealth e¤ects. He nds that adopting an instrument rule that responds
to the stock-price gap incurs risks of endogenous instability that depend on the average price
markup in the economy, while reacting to the stock-price growth can achieve substantial stability
gains. These ndings are in line with the analytical results presented in this paper. Pfajfar and
Santoro (2008) show that when cost side e¤ects are at work responding to asset price deviations
from their frictionless level might be benecial from the vantage of equilibrium determinacy. This
result is intimately linked to the presence of nominal stickiness and the way this reects into the
relationship between rmsprotability and output gap.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 1 introduces the theoretical setting
proposed by Bullard and Schaling (2002), while Section 2 explores the conditions for equilibrium
uniqueness under a rule responding to stock prices growth; last section concludes.
2. Model
Bullard and Schaling (2002) develop their analysis on the framework put forward by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999). They consider an economy characterized by a continuum of innitely-lived
agents that derive utility from consumption and incur disutility from production. Each household
produces a single di¤erentiated good, but consumes a Dixit-Stiglitz bundle of the goods produced
in the economy. Output is sold at a utility-maximizing price under the constraint that only a
fraction of the goods prices may be changed in any given period and that other prices must be
left at their value in the previous period. This introduces price stickiness. The solution of the
2Bernanke and Gertler (2001) comment on these results claiming that, although the models used are similar,
Genberg et al. (2000) assume that the policymaker knows with certainty the stock price process and, most importantly,
when the bubble is going to burst.
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householdsproblem, suitably linearized and simplied as in Woodford (1999), produces equations
(1) and (2) below which describe the dynamics of output and ination in the economy. The rst
equation is given by:
xt = Etxt+1    1 (it   Ett+1   int ) ; (1)
where xt denotes output gap, t is the ination rate, it is the the nominal (risk free) interest rate,
int is a shock term that follows an AR(1) process.
Ination is determined by:
t = Ett+1 + xt; (2)
where  relates to the degree of price stickiness and  denotes the traditional discount factor.
2.1. Equity Prices. In the Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) framework, as in many dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium frameworks, arbitrage relationships can be used to price any asset
that might be held by households, provided that nancial markets are complete. This means that
a nancial claim on a random nominal quantity XT has value Et [t;TXT ] at time t, where t;T is
the stochastic discount factor:
t;T =
U
0
(CT )
U 0 (Ct)
;
where U
0
(Ct) is the marginal utility derived from consumption at time t. The gross nominal interest
rate on a nominal one-period bond is then given by:
Rt = Et [t;t+1]
 1 ;
as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). Since the stochastic discount factor prices all assets in this
model, Bullard and Schaling (2002) denote the price of a share of aggregate equity by Qt and note
that Qt = 1=Rt. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), the short-term nominal interest rate is
dened as it = lnRt: Therefore, as lnRt =   lnQt; we conclude that:
it =  qt; (3)
where qt = lnQt.
2.2. Monetary Policy and Stock Price Dynamics. We close the model with an instru-
mental Taylor-type policy rule. We opt for a rule where the nominal rate of interest reacts to
lagged values of ination and output deviations from its equilibrium level. This specication is
considered operational by McCallum (1999), as it does not call for the central bank to react to
contemporaneous or expected future data on output gap and ination. The interest on this rule
over other alternatives derives from the consideration that it requires information that is plausibly
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in possess of the central bank. However, the nature of the Taylor-type rule is not crucial for the
results reported in this paper.
We also assume that policy makers wish to include an explicit response to the stock price growth
rate qt(= qt   qt 1). Conversely, Bullard and Schaling (2002) assume a monetary authority re-
sponding to percentage deviations of the general level of equity prices from the long-run equilibrium
level (qt   q).
The form of the policy rule we wish to study is therefore:
it = t 1 + xxt 1 + qqt;
with q > 0. Given (3), this rule can be re-parameterized as:
it = iit 1 + t 1 + xxt 1; (4)
where
i =
q
1 + q
 =

1 + q
x =
x
1 + q
:
Thus, the resulting rule features a smoothing term. In particular, the policy instrument is set as
a convex combination between lagged interest rate and a component reecting the original response
to lagged output gap and ination. This rule is isomorphic to the one explored by Bullard and
Mitra (2007). Notice that, in case the central bank responded to a term (qt  q), we would obtain
an instrumental rule similar to the one explored by Bullard and Schaling (2002):3
it = t 1 + xxt 1:
In this case, the overall response to ination and output is weakened by the response to asset price
gap
 
q

. As the response to equity prices misalignments increases, it tends to drive the coe¢ cients
on ination and output gap to zero. Bullard and Schaling (2002) report some results from Bullard
and Mitra (2002) to discuss this implication and show that, as q !1, indeterminacy is inevitable.
When we implement the policy rule (4), the response to ination and output is still weakened,
but the monetary authority attaches higher importance to the smoothing term:
@i
@q
> 0;
@
@q
< 0;
@x
@q
< 0:
This feature of rule (4) turns out to be crucial to the results reported in the remainder of the
paper. Bullard and Mitra (2007) study the e¤ect of policy inertia on the conditions for equilibrium
3 It is worth pointing out that Bullard and Schaling (2002) employ a contemporaneous data rule.
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uniqueness. They consider a policy rule similar to (4):
it =  iit 1 +  t 1 +  xxt 1; (5)
where  i;  ;  x are generic non-negative parameters. In order to transpose their analysis to our
case, we can re-write the system under its state-space representation:
Etyt+1 = Byt + Ci
n
t ;
where yt = [xt; t; it]
0
and
B =
264 1 + 
 1   1 
  1  1 0
 x    i
375 ;
where C is omitted since it is not needed in what follows. Since it is predetermined while xt
and t are free variables, according to Blanchard and Kahn (1980) equilibrium is determinate
if and only if exactly one eigenvalue of B lies within the unit circle. Woodford (2003) provides
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for determinacy of equilibrium in such a system. The details
of these calculations are provided in Appendix A of Bullard and Mitra (2007). The following two
conditions are shown to be jointly necessary for determinacy:
 (  +  i   1) + (1  ) x > 0; (6)
[ + (2 + )] i + 2 (1 + ) >  [ (    1) + (1 + ) x] : (7)
Condition (6) is precisely what Woodford (2001, 2003) refers to as the Taylor principle, whereby
in the event of a permanent one percent rise in ination, the cumulative increase in the nominal
interest rate is more than one percent. However, the Taylor principle is not generally su¢ cient for
determinacy, because another necessary condition for determinacy is condition (7). This proves the
following result:
Proposition 1. Bullard and Mitra (2007).
Assume that  (  +  i   1)+(1  ) x > 0 for the inertial lagged data interest rule (5). Then
a necessary condition for determinacy is:
[ + (2 + )] i + 2 (1 + ) >  [ (    1) + (1 + ) x] :
Proof. See Bullard and Mitra (2007), Appendix A.
This proposition shows that the Taylor principle is no longer su¢ cient to guarantee determinacy,
since it is also necessary that the degree of inertia  i be large enough. If the central bank merely
responds aggressively to ination and output without displaying enough inertia, then the condition
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for determinacy may be violated. Bullard and Mitra (2007) also show that a set of necessary and
su¢ cient conditions required for determinacy reduce to (6), (7) and:
 i > 2  (1 + ) 1: (8)
The right hand expression in (8) is less than 1 since  > 0,  > 0, and 0 <  < 1. These
conditions show that a large enough value of  i always results in determinacy since this contributes
to satisfy conditions (6), (7), and (8). A value of  i  1 always fullls (6) and (8), so that if  i
also satises condition (7), the conditions for determinacy are met. Bullard and Mitra (2007) show
that the analytical results given above provide intuition for a number of results obtained in more
complicated models, such as those explored by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and McCallum and
Nelson (1999). These studies generally conrm that large values of  i tend to be associated with
a unique equilibrium, provided that other conditions on the structural parameters are satised.
Let us now transpose this analysis to our context. In terms of our parameterization, the
conditions above can be expressed as:
 (   1) + (1  ) x > 0; (9)
[2 + (2 + )] q + 2 (1 + )
 
1 + q

>  [ (   1) + (1 + ) x] : (10)
Again, the rst condition corresponds to the Taylor principle. The introduction of an explicit
response to asset rates of return only a¤ects the second condition. Thus, we can reformulate the
proposition above as follows:
Proposition 2. Assume that  (   1) + (1  ) x > 0 for the inertial lagged data interest rule
(4). Then a necessary condition for determinacy is:
[2 + (2 + )] q + 2 (1 + )
 
1 + q

>  [ (   1) + (1 + ) x] :
Proof. See Bullard and Mitra (2007), Appendix A.
It is clear that the left hand expression in (10) increases in q. Therefore, provided that the
Taylor principle holds, an increase in the degree of responsiveness to asset rates of return will relax
the constraint. Moreover, in order to account for the full set of su¢ cient and necessary conditions for
determinacy, according to Woodford (2003) and Bullard and Mitra (2007), the following constraint
should be added to (9) and (10):
q >
2  
  1 ; (11)
where  = (1 + ) 1. Therefore, an increse in q relaxes the constraint and alleviates the risk
of indeterminacy.
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Thus, we show that i

= q=
 
1  q

can be obtained as a structural parameter from a Taylor
rule where the monetary authority responds to stock price growth rates along with reacting to lagged
ination and output gap. In turn, this rule is isomorphic to an instrumental rule featuring policy
inertia. These results suggest that the reaction parameters in the inertial rule could indeed reect
an interest in stock market developments from the policy makers perspective. This is in line with
the arguments explored by Rudebusch (2006), where it is suggested that an obvious rationale for
policy gradualism would be some desire on the part of the central bank to reduce the volatility in
interest rates and, more generally, in asset prices.
3. Concluding Remarks
In the last decade a number of contributions have explored the role and the scope of monetary
authorities in acting to enhance nancial stability along with ensuring price stability. The general
wisdom is that including equity prices misalignments from their equilibrium level into a Taylor rule
does not improve economic performance, and might possibly harm both real and nancial stability,
by introducing a root of indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium.
In this note we show that an explicit response to stock price growth rates translates into a
policy rule featuring an interest rate smoothing term. In this case the reponse coe¢ cient to the
lagged rate of interest increases in the degree of aggressiveness towards rates of return on equity.
Conversely, the structural response coe¢ cients to output gap and ination are weakened by an
increase in the response to stock prices growth. Therefore, as the central bank attaches higher
importance to stock price dynamics, it will smooth out changes in the nominal rate of interest.
This results suggest that the reaction parameters in inertial rules could indeed reect an interest
in stock market developments from the policy makers perspective. As shown by Bullard and
Mitra (2007), an increased degree of interest rate smoothing may help at alleviating problems of
indeterminacy and non-existence of stationary equilibrium observed for some commonly-studied
monetary policy rules.
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